Blind multisignature (BMS), first introduced by Horster et al, constitutes a crucial primitive that allows a user to generate a signature of a message from multiple signers, while the signers cannot obtain any information about the message. With these useful properties, blind multisignature is suitable for electronic payments and electronic voting. However, most of the current BMS schemes may be attacked by quantum computers in the future because they are based on traditional number theories, such as discrete logarithm assumption and large integer factor assumption. In this work, we first formalize the notion and the sound security models of the identity-based blind multisignature scheme (IDBMS). Then we present an instantiation based on lattices, along with rigorous proofs of the blindness and unforgeability under the lattice hard assumption (short integer solution, SIS), which is considered to remain secure under quantum computer attacks. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first identity-based quantum-resistant scheme that has the advantages of blind signature and multisignature.
I. INTRODUCTION
The blind signature scheme, first introduced by Chaum in 1983 [1] , is a promising cryptographic primitive due to its blindness. This scheme consists of three entities: a user, a signer, and a verifier. The user can generate a signature σ of a message µ with the help of the signer, while the signer cannot obtain any information about the message µ. The verifier can verify the signature σ of the message µ that is signed by the signer. This property is suitable for various applications, such as electronic payments and electronic voting [2] - [5] . Take electronic payment as an example. Users withdraw electronic coins that are blindly signed by the electronic coin issuer (signer). Then, they can spend these electronic coins that can be authenticated using the public key of the issuer. However, in a real environment, an electronic coin may require being signed by multiple issuers at the same time, and the total size of the signatures will increase linearly with the number of the issuers. Therefore, how to reduce it becomes an important problem.
To address this issue, Petersen et al. proposed the first blind multisignature (BMS) scheme using the advantages of the multisignature scheme [6] . In their scheme, a user The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Giacomo Verticale .
can generate a signature σ of a message µ with the help of multiple signers, while all the signers cannot obtain any information about the message. This signature σ can be verified by a key that combines all the signers' public keys. They also showed how to use the BMS scheme as a building block to construct electronic voting. Because this property is suitable for a multi-user scenario, many BMS schemes have been proposed in the last two decades and applied to many scenarios. In 2003, Chen et al. proposed a BMS scheme from bilinear pairings [7] . In 2006, Hanatani et al. constructed provably electronic cash from a BMS scheme [8] . In 2015, Namdeo proposed an untraceable BMS scheme [9] . Recently, Tan et al. proposed a BMS scheme based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem [10] , [11] .
Unfortunately, current research results only focus on the application scenario and how to construct an efficient scheme. The security of these schemes relies on traditional mathematics assumptions, such as the discrete logarithms assumption and large integer factoring assumption. According to Shor's work [12] , there is a quantum algorithm that can solve the prime factorization and discrete logarithm assumption in polynomial time. Therefore, the above schemes will certainly suffer attacks by quantum computers in the future.
Most of the existing schemes are designed on certificatebased cryptography instead of identity-based cryptography.
In certificate-based cryptography, the user's public key is necessary for certification by the public key authentication framework, such as public key infrastructure (PKI). Additionally, the public key is a random string, which is hard for verifiers to store or remember. On the other hand, identitybased cryptography, first introduced by Shimar in 1984 [13] , uses the user's identifier information, such as email address, name, social security number, etc., as the public key for performing encryption or verification. It eliminates the necessity of the PKI and uses the identifier information as the public key, which is more suitable for real scenarios.
For these reasons, it is important to determine whether we can construct a quantum-resistant identity-based blind multisignature scheme from lattices.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we first formalize the notion and security models of the identity-based blind multisignature scheme (IDBMS). Then, we provide a concrete instantiation based on lattices, and show that our scheme has blindness and unforgeability based on the short integer solution (SIS) assumption. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first quantumresistant IDBMS scheme in which the size of the blind signature will not increase with the number of signers. We also compare with other state-of-the-art works [14] and show that our scheme can reduce the sizes of blind signatures effectively.
Hereunder, we briefly sketch our scheme and describe the technique we use. Inspired by Zhang et al. blind signature [14] and Tian and Huang identity-based signature [15] , the basic strategy for constructing our scheme is to use lattice-based trapdoor functions and rejection sampling technology. In our scheme, there are four main characters, authority key generator center KGC, a user U, a verifier V, and a group of signers S = {S 1 , · · · , S N }, where N ≥ 1. The KGC generates the master public/private keys using the TrapGen function, that is (A 0 , B 0 ) ← TrapGen(q, n, m), where q, n, m are some parameters. Actually, the master private key B 0 is a basis of the lattice ⊥ q (A 0 ), such that A 0 B 0 = 0 (mod q). Then, the KGC generates each signer's signing key sk S i = B i using the SampleMat function with the hash value of the signer's identity
The signing protocol is a four-stages interactive algorithm between U and S. Each signer generates a blind signature σ i for a message m i using a rejection sampling technique with his/her signing key, and sends σ i to U. Then U can combine each σ i into one blind multisignature σ , to reduce the total size of the signature. More precisely, this method is inspired by the lattice-based multisignature scheme proposed by Bansarkhani and Sturm work [16] . Finally, U generates a blind multisignature σ that can be verified by V using signers' identities.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
• First, we formalize the notion and the sound security models of the identity-based blind multisignature scheme.
• Second, we propose the first quantum-resistant IDBMS scheme from lattices. Our proposed scheme allows a user to generate a blind signature from a group of signers, while all signers cannot obtain any information about the message. In addition, the size of the signature will not increase with the number of signers.
• Third, concerning the adversarial model, rigorous security proofs are presented to show that our scheme is blind and unforgeable under a lattice hard assumption. That is, even under an attack from a quantum computer, our scheme can maintain its security.
• Fourth, compared to [14] , we show that our scheme can effectively reduce the sizes of signatures.
B. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We start with some preliminaries on lattices and some trapdoor functions in Section II. In Section III, we introduce a general system and security model for the identity-based blind multisignature scheme. We propose our scheme from lattices and compare it to Zhang's scheme in Section IV. In Section V, we demonstrate security proofs to show that our scheme is blind and unforgeable. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section provides some cryptography primitives and definitions required for our construction.
A. NOTATION
For simplicity and readability, we use the following symbols throughout the paper. We use λ to represent the security parameter and use the abbreviation PPT to mean probabilistic polynomial time. We use standard big-O, little-o, and littleω notations to classify the growth of functions. In addition, we say that f (λ) =Õ(g(λ)) if f (λ) = O(g(λ)·log c λ) for some fixed constant c. We also use poly(λ) to indicate a generic polynomial function f (λ) = O(λ c ) for some constant c. The notation negl(λ) denotes that any function f is negligible in λ where f (λ) = o(λ −c ) for every fixed constant c. We also show a set of real numbers by R, and a set of integers by Z. For x ∈ R, exp(x) denotes the exponent of x, that is e x . Conventionally, vectors are written in bold lower-case letters (e.g., x), while matrices are written in bold capital letters (e.g., A). For a vector x, x and x 1 denote the Euclidean norm of x and the Manhattan distance of x , respectively. For two vectors v, w, v, w denotes the inner product of v and w. For a full rank square matrix B,B denotes the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of B. For k ∈ {0, 1} * , |k| denotes the bit-length of k, and k i denotes the i-bit of k. For a finite set Q, a ← Q denotes the sampling of a from Q with uniform distribution. Finally, let X , Y be two random variables that take values in Z , which is the union of supports of X and Y , then their statistical distance is defined as
B. LATTICES BACKGROUND
The construction for our IDBMS scheme is based on lattices.
In this section, we first give a brief introduction to the lattice. An m-dimensional lattice is a discrete subgroup of R m , which is defined as follows.
The lattice generated by B is the set of linear combinations of the columns of B with coefficients in Z, (B) = {a 1 b 1 + a 2 b 2 + · · · + a n b n : a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a n ∈ Z}. In this case, the set of vectors b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b n is called a basis of . If n = m, we say it is a full-rank lattice. In addition, we say that a lattice is a q-ary lattice if (qZ) m ⊆ ⊆ Z m for some integer q.
Definition 2 (The q-ary Lattices): For prime q and A ∈ Z n×m q , we can define the q-ary lattices as follows.
The security analysis of our proposed scheme is based on the lattice hard assumption, short integer solution (SIS), first introduced by Ajtai [17] . Based on his work, Micciancio and Regev showed that solving the SIS q,n,m,β problem in the average-case can be reduced to solvingÕ(β √ n)-SIVP problem in the worst-case [18] .
The SIS q,n,m,β problem is to find a nonzero vector x ∈ Z m such that Ax = 0 (mod q) and x ≤ β.
C. DISCRETE GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION
In this section, we first define the discrete normal distribution over a lattice.
Definition 4 (Discrete Normal Distribution over ): If any parameter s > 0, center c ∈ R m , The Gaussian function can be defined by
In addition, let g c,s ( ) be a sum of g c,s over the lattice . We can define the discrete Gaussian function over lattice as
Then, we define continuous Gaussian distribution over R m and discrete Gaussian distribution over Z m as follows. 
, respectively. The below lemma provides two basic properties of discrete Gaussian distributions that will be used in the rejection sampling technique [18] , [19] .
Lemma 1: For k ≥ 1, the following formula is satisfied.
). In addition, for any ζ, r > 0, and a vector v ∈ R m , we have
Hereunder, we recall some theorems that will be used in our scheme. Theorem 1 shows that there exists a PPT algorithm that can generate a pair (A, S), where S is a short basis for the lattice ⊥ q (A) [20] . Theorem 1: Let q ≥ 3 be odd and m > 5n log q. There is a PPT algorithm TrapGen(q, n, m) that outputs a pair (A ∈ Z n×m q , B ∈ Z m×m ) such that A is statistically close to a uniform matrix in Z n×m and B is a basis for ⊥ q (A) satisfying B ≤ O(n log q) and B ≤ O( √ n log q) with overwhelming probability.
The following two theorems show how to invert the SIS function using a lattice basis [21] , [22] .
Theorem 2: Let m ≥ n be an integer and let q be prime. 
The rejection sampling technique was first applied to latticebased signatures in Lyubashevsky's work [19] , making the signing key independent from the outputted signature. That is, we can sample a signature without revealing any secret information. For example, if we want to generate a signature σ for a message µ using signing key k, then we let the distribution of the signature be f , which is independent of k and let g be the distribution of the signature, which is related to k. The rejection sampling is that if f (x) ≤ Kg(x) for all x and K > 0, we can generate a signature σ which is independent of the signing key k with probability f (σ )/Kg(σ ), where K is the expected number of times that will output a signature.
The area between f (σ ) and Kg(σ ) is called the rejection area. Furthermore, Lyubashevsky provided the following useful lemma in [19] Lemma 3:
, and a probability distribution h that maps V to R. Then there exists a constant K = O(1) such that the statistical distance of the following distribution F 1 :
III. IDENTITY-BASED BLIND MULTISIGNATURE SCHEME
We now precisely formalize the definition and security requirements of the IDBMS scheme. For convenience, let M be the message space and S = {S 1 , · · · , S N } be the identities of the N signers who agree to sign a message µ ∈ M collectively, and U be the user who wants to generate a blind multisignature.
A. SYNTAX OF IDBMS
We say that an IDBMS scheme consists of four algorithms (Setup, Extract, Sign, and Verify) which are defined as follows.
• Setup(1 λ ) → (pp, mpk, msk): On input of the security parameter λ, the probabilistic algorithm outputs public parameter pp, a master private key msk, and a master public key mpk.
• Extract(pp, mpk, msk, S id ) → sk S id : On input of the public parameter pp, master public key mpk, master private key msk, and signer identity S id , the probabilistic algorithm outputs a signing key sk S id for signer S id .
• Sign(pp, µ, S, sk S , mpk) → σ : It is an interactive algorithm between user U and a group of signers S. On input of the public parameter pp, message µ ∈ M, signers' identities S, their corresponding signer keys sk S , master public key mpk, and message µ, the algorithm outputs an identity-based blind multisignature σ .
• Verify(pp, σ, µ, S, mpk) → {0, 1}: On input of the public parameter pp, identity-based blind multisignature σ , message µ, set of signers' identities S, and master public key mpk, the deterministic algorithm outputs 1 if the signature is valid and all signers indeed signed the message, and 0 otherwise.
In addition, the correctness of IDBMS is defined as follows.
Definition 7: Let λ be a security parameter; we say that an IDBMS scheme is correct if the probability Pr[Verify(pp, Sign(pp, µ, S, sk S , mpk), µ, S, mpk) = 1] is equal to 1 with overwhelming probability, where (pp, mpk, msk) is outputted by Setup(1 λ ), and each signer's signing key sk S id is generated by Extract(pp, mpk).
B. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF IDBMS
We now define the security requirements for the IDBMS scheme, which follows those defined in [23] - [25] . For an IDBMS scheme, the securities requirements that must be considered are blindness and unforgeability.
1) BLINDNESS
The blindness of the IDBMS scheme is defined as the following game. Let A be a PPT adversary who plays the role of the group of signers, and U 0 , U 1 be two honest users. In the game of blindness, U 0 and U 1 engage in the blind multisignature scheme with A on messages µ b and µ 1−b , and output signatures σ b and σ 1−b , respectively, where b ∈ {0, 1} is a random bit chosen uniformly. The messages µ 0 , mu 1 and the output signatures σ 0 , σ 1 are sent to the adversary A, and A outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b , we say that A wins the game.
Definition 8 (Blindness):
We say that an IDBMS scheme has blindness if there is no adversary A who wins the above game with a non-negligible advantage δ.
2) UNFORGEABILITY
Unforgeability ensures that a malicious user cannot forge a blind multisignature from an honest signer. We define the unforgeability of the IDBMS scheme via the following game, which is played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Setup. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter λ and sends the public parameter pp and the master public key mpk to A, and keeps the master private key msk secret.
• Queries. The adversary A performs the following queries adaptively.
-Hash function query: The hash function query only exists when the security is analyzed under a random oracle model. The challenger C computes an output of the hash function and sends the output to A. -Extract query: The adversary A can issue this query to obtain the signing key of a signer S id . In response, the challenger C runs the algorithm Extract(pp, mpk, msk, S id ) and returns a signing key sk S id to the adversary A. -Sign query: When the adversary A issues such a query on message µ and an identity list S, the challenger C returns a signature µ as a response.
• Forgery. In the end, A outputs a tuple (σ , µ , S ). If the tuple satisfies the following requirements, A wins the above game.
• σ is a valid signature on message µ under the signers' identity list S .
• At least one signer S i ∈ S has not been queried during the Extract queries.
• (S , µ ) has never been queried during the Sign queries. Definition 9 (Unforgeability): We say that an IDBMS scheme is existential unforgeable under adaptive chosen message and identity attacks if there is no PPT adversary A who wins the above game with a non-negligible advantage.
IV. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME A. DESCRIPTION OF THE SCHEME
Hereunder, we describe the whole construction of the IDBMS scheme from lattices. The main steps of our construction are provided as follows, and the parameters we used are listed in Table 1 . Note that the parameters K 1 , K 2 , K 3 are the expected number of times to generate a sample using rejection sampling. Therefore, we must set these as small as possible.
• Setup(1 λ ): Given a security parameter λ, the algorithm performs as follows.
1) It chooses prime q > 3, n is a power of 2, and sets m > 5n log q. 2) It chooses k, κ ∈ Z + , such that 2 κ k κ ≥ 2 100 . This is to make Lemma 4 correct. 6) It sets K 1 = exp(12ζ 1 √ κ/ + κ/(2ζ 2 1 )), K 2 = exp(1 + 1/288), and K 3 = exp(1 + 1/288). 7) It outputs the public parameters pp = {q, n, m, k, η,
, H 1 , H 2 }, master public key mpk = A 0 , and master private key msk = B 0 .
• Extract(pp, mpk, msk, S id ): Given the public parameter pp, master public key mpk = A 0 , master private key msk = B 0 , and a signer's identity S id , the algorithm extracts a signer's signing key as follows.
1) It computes the hash value of the signer's identity
3) It outputs sk S id = B id for signer S id .
• Sign(pp, µ, S, sk S , mpk): This is a four-stage interactive algorithm between a user and a group of signers. On input public parameter pp, a message µ, signers' identities S = {S 1 , · · · , S N } with their signing keys sk S , and a master public key mpk = A 0 , the algorithm generates a signature by performing the following stages. Note that if e, y N i=1 , and z are produced in the rejection area, they will be rejected. 1) Each signer S i → User U: a) It chooses r i ← D m ζ 2 , and computes , 1). c) If z is in the rejection area, it sends (a, b, c, com(t, µ)) to each signer. Signers restart the protocol if the following conditions are satisfied. com(t, µ) ). com(t, µ) ).
-y + a in the rejection area. d) Else, it outputs a blind multisignature σ = (z, c, t) [14] under N signers setting.
• Verify(pp, σ, µ, S, mpk): Given the public parameter pp, a signature σ = (z, c, t) , a message µ, the identity list of all signers S = {S 1 , · · · , S N }, and the master public key mpk = A 0 , the algorithm checks whether the signature is valid as follows. Proof 1: Given master public key mpk, master private key msk, a group of signers' identities S = {S 1 , · · · , S N }, a message µ, and a signature σ = (µ, (z, c, t) ), we have com(t, µ) ). In addition, with Lemma 1, z is less equal than ηζ 3 √ m with overwhelming probability. Therefore, the verifier can verify the signature σ with Verify(pp, σ, µ, S, mpk) = 1.
C. COMPARISON Table 2 shows the comparison with [14] . In this comparison, we assume that a user communicates with N signers to generate a blind multisignature in our scheme, while the user generates N blind signature in [14] . The symbol |ID| denotes the length of a signer's identity, d is an integer, σ is a standard deviation, and m = 64 + n log q/ log(2d + 1) in the setting of [14] . Although the size of the signer's secret key is larger than [14] , our scheme reduces the size of the public key. Additionally, the size of our signature is smaller than [14] when the user generates a signature with multiple signers. Note that because the security requirement is the same as for blind signature, we do not provide a comparison with [14] . As for efficiency, the cost of generating a blind multisignature is also the same as [14] .
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will provide security proofs to show that our scheme has blindness and unforgeability by following the idea of [14] .
A. BLINDNESS
In this section, we prove that our scheme is statistically blind. We use A to represent the group of malicious signers who want to distinguish the views V 0 , V 1 generated by different messages µ 0 , µ 1 from two users U 0 , U 1 , respectively.
Theorem 5: The proposed scheme is blind if commitment function com is δ-hiding.
Proof 2: In this proof, we show that the adversary A cannot obtain information about the signed message. We analyze the distribution of e, z, and the situation that protocol restarts. Note that due to c, t being generated from a secure hash function and randomness, we need not worry.
• Distribution of e. First, we let e b , e 1−b be the value generated by U b (mpk, µ b ) and U 1−b (mpk, µ 1−b ), respectively. For our proposed scheme, e b is generated by rejection sampling with the probability min (D k ζ 1 (e b )/K 1 D k c,ζ 1 (e b ), 1) and e 1−b is generated by rejection sampling with the probability min (D k ζ 1 (e 1−b )/K 1 D k c,ζ 1 (e 1−b ), 1), thus they have the same distribution D k ζ 1 . Moreover, their statistical distance is (e b , e 1−b ) = 0. Therefore, e b (e 1−b ) are independent with its corresponding message µ b (µ 1−b ). Therefore, the adversary A cannot distinguish them.
• Distribution of z. It is similar to e. Let z b , z 1−b be the values generated by U b (mpk, µ b ) and U 1−b (mpk, µ 1−b ), respectively. Because z b is generated by rejection sampling with the probability min (D m ζ 3 (z b )/K 3 D m y,ζ 3 (z b ), 1), and z 1−b is generated by rejection sampling with the probability min (D m ζ 3 (z 1−b )/K 3 D m y,ζ 3 (z 1−b ), 1), they have the same distribution D m ζ 3 and their statistical distance is (z b , z 1−b ) = 0. Therefore, z b (z 1−b ) are independent with its corresponding message µ b (µ 1−b ), and the adversary A cannot distinguish them.
• Restarts. For each session for our protocol, the user will select fresh t, a, b which are statistically independent of the previous session due to the hiding property of the commitment function com. With the δ-hiding property, the adversary A never obtains the information of the message µ. Therefore, our protocol has blindness if the commitment function com is δ-hiding.
B. UNFORGEABILITY
Theorem 6: The proposed scheme is existential unforgeable under the adaptive chosen message and identity attacks based on the hardness of the SIS q,n,m,β problem for β = 2(ηζ 3 + ζ 0 N κ) √ m. Proof 3: In the following proof, let A be an adversary who wants to break the unforgeability of the proposed scheme, and C be an SIS challenger. In addition, C is given an SIS instance A 0 ∈ Z n×m q , where q is a large prime, n is a power of 2, and m ≥ 5n log q. The following statement will prove that if A can break the unforgeability of our scheme, then C can solve the SIS q,n,m,β assumption. The purpose of C is to find a nonzero vector v such that A 0 v = 0 (mod q) and v ≤ 2(ηζ 3 
• Setup. In this phase, C runs the Setup algorithm to choose (k,
). Then C sets the public parameter pp = {q, n, m, k,
}, and master public key mpk = A 0 . C also chooses three hash lists, H 1 -list, H 2 -list, and Sign-list, and sets them as empty. Finally, C sends pp and mpk to A.
• Queries. In this phase, A can request the following queries adaptively. , · · · , S N }, µ), C performs the following steps. 1) For each S i ∈ S, C queries H 2 on identity S i to obtain A i .
2) C computes
3) C chooses a random matrix z ∈ Z m satisfies that z ≤ ηζ 3 √ m. 4) C chooses a random vector c ← {v : v ∈ {−1, 0, 1} k , v ≤ κ}, and selects t ← {0, 1} * . 5) C sets c = H 1 (A 0 z − A τ c, com(t, µ)). 6) Finally, C returns a signature σ = (z, c, t) as a response, and stores a tuple (σ, S, µ) in the Sign-list.
• Forgery. After querying above queries, with nonnegligible probability δ, A finally outputs a forgery signature σ = (z , c , t ) on message µ with an identity list of signers S = {S 1 , · · · , S N }. After A forged the signature σ , C will use the following method to obtain a solution v such that A 0 v = 0 (mod q) and v ≤ 2(ηζ 3 + ζ 0 N κ) √ m. C reruns A again with the same random tape but the output sequence of the H 1 and H 2 queries are different. By the general forking lemma [26] , A outputs a new forgery (z , c , t ) on the same message µ and identity list S with probability of at least δ/2, such that z = z , c = c , and A 0 z − A τ c = A 0 z − A τ c . After replacing where m > 5n log q, for randomly chosen S ← {−ζ 0 N , · · · , 0, · · · , ζ 0 N } m×k . When the parameters are set under our scheme, with a probability of at least 1 − 2 −100 , there exists another S ∈ {−ζ 0 N , · · · , 0, · · · , ζ 0 N } m×k such that AS = AS .
Proof 4: (Proof of Lemma 4) The proof is similar to the proof in [19] Lemma 5.2. The probability of randomly choosing non-colliding elements is at most q n×k (2ζ 0 N + 1) m×k ≤ q n×k (2ζ 0 N ) 5n log q×k .
Therefore, for our setting (q = 2 27 , n = 512, k = 80, N = 10, ζ 0 = 64), the probability of colliding elements is at least 1 − 2 27 * 80 2 * 64 * 10 5 * 512 * 27 * 80 ≥ 1 − 2 −100 .
Because the N i=1 B i and B * are independent of the signatures and act as the same role in our proposed scheme, A cannot obtain the information about which of them was used in the simulation. Therefore, with the above statements, C can find a non-zero solution v = z − z + N i=1 B i c − N i=1 B i c with a probability of at least 1/2 such that A 0 v = 0 (mod q), and v ≤ 2(ηζ 3 + ζ 0 N κ) √ m
VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, we propose a quantum-resistant identity-based blind multisignature scheme. The construction is based on a lattice hard assumption (short integer solution, SIS). It is the first quantum-resistant instantiation that has the advantages of blind signature and multisignature. We have also shown that our scheme is blind and unforgeable with rigorous formal proofs. Currently, we are working on constructing a quantumresistant identity-based blind multisignature scheme in the standard model.
